Inflation, Liquidity Risk and Long-run TFP - Growth by Evers, Michael et al.
    DYNREG   
  Dynamic Regions in a Knowledge- 
          Driven Global Economy 





















                                                              
Inflation, Liquidity Risk and Long-run 






































48  / 2009        
WORKING PAPERS Ination, liquidity risk, and long-run TFP-growth




This paper demonstrates a negative relation between ination and long-run produc-
tivity growth. Ination generates long-run real eects due to a link from the short-run
nominal and nancial frictions to a rm's qualitative investment portfolio. We develop
an endogenous growth model whose key ingredients are (i) a nominal short-run portfolio
choice for households, (ii) an agency problem which gives rise to nancial market incom-
pleteness, (iii) a rm-level technology choice between a return-dominated but secure and
a more productive but risky project. In this framework, ination increases the costs of
corporate insurance against productive but risky projects and hence a rm's choice of
technology. It follows that each level of ination is associated with a dierent long-run
balanced growth path for the economy as long as nancial markets are incomplete. Fi-
nally, we apply U.S. industry and rm level data to examine the relevance of our specic
microeconomic mechanism. We nd that (i) rms insure systematically against risky
R&D investments by means of corporate liquidity holdings, (ii) periods of higher ination
restrain rm-level R&D investments by reducing corporate liquidity holdings.
1 Introduction
Does ination reduce long-run economic growth? If so, what is the key transmission mecha-
nism relating ination to long-run growth? To answer these questions, we provide empirical
evidence - in accordance with Fischer (1993) and others - that the level of ination reduces
long-run productivity growth. Thereafter, we develop a novel theoretical explanation for a
long-run relation between the two variables in the context of an endogenous growth model with
nancial market frictions. Our transmission mechanism relates the qualitative composition of
investments, instead of their quantity, to the level of ination. Hence, we partly endogenize
total factor productivity (TFP) by demonstrating that monetary policy is a relevant component
of long-run TFP-growth. Finally, we present micro-econometric evidence from disaggregated
U.S. sectoral and rm-level data that is consistent with our specic microeconomic mechanism
underlying the macroeconomic monetary transmission channel.
Recent progress in development accounting have identied dierences in total factor produc-
tivity (TFP), rather than physical or human capital accumulation, as the main factor generating
cross-country income and growth dierences.1 Accordingly, variations in TFP explain about
1Caselli (2005) provides an exhaustive survey of recent contributions to development accounting and demon-
strates the robustness of this result.
12/3 of the variations in income across countries. However, TFP is measured as the component of
output that is not explained by labor or (human) capital inputs. Therefore, Abramovitz (1956)
refers to this residual measure as the "measure of our ignorance". Against this background,
substantial eorts have been devoted to endogenize TFP.2 The eect of nominal variables on
real economic activities, on the other hand, has been mainly analyzed in a business cycle frame-
work. In this respect, it is well recognized that monetary policy can inuence uctuations in
real variables in the short-run, but most theoretical contributions treat monetary policy shocks
and total factor productivity as orthogonal in the long-run. Accordingly, the determinants of
growth and cycles are most often regarded as two separated entities.3
Our theoretical contribution takes a dierent route and combines elements of the growth
and business cycle literature. Specically, we analyze the interplay between short-run nominal
and nancial frictions and its eect on long-run endogenous technological change. The standard
endogenous growth model is supplemented in three dimensions. First, we incorporate a technol-
ogy choice for producers. That is, intermediate rms can channel investments into two distinct
projects: a safe, but return-dominated ("basic") and a superior ("advanced") project which
yields higher expected returns, but is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. We attribute
investments that enhance the stock of technologies available for a rm, e.g. R&D expenses,
to the advanced projects since this type of investment is considered to be more productive,
but also more risky. Thus, (part of the) expenses for advanced technologies generate a positive
externality on the future stock of knowledge/technologies available in the economy. In contrast,
investments in the basic technology reect, for example, expenses for machines of the same vin-
tage relative to previous ones. Moreover, rms operating the advanced technology can insure
themselves against the idiosyncratic liquidity risk by means of holding a precautionary stock of
readily marketable assets; however, due to an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, which is
the second key building block of the model, the scope for insurance is limited. The consequence
of this friction is that nancial markets are incomplete in that scarce liquidity - along the lines of
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) - can not be eciently provided to the productive sector. Third,
we assume that households are required to hold cash in order to consume at the end of a period.
This short-run cash-in-advance constraint implies that households have to choose between cash
holdings for consumption purposes and deposits with a nancial intermediary that earn a net
interest rate. It follows that the short-run supply of nominal assets (liquidity) is costly even
in an environment of exible prices. Taken together with the positive short-run demand for
liquidity of rms operating the advanced technology this approach involves a positive short-run
nominal interest rate that represents the cost of insurance against liquidity shocks. That is, the
nominal interest rate constitutes an additional cost of production by means of the advanced
technology relative to the basic one. This complementarity between corporate liquidity hold-
ings and a rm's ability to invest in productive but risky projects leads to a type of ination
2The title of a contribution by Prescott (1998) anticipates recent developments in the endogenous growth
literature: "Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity". So far, the most prominent explanations for
cross-country dierences in TFP concentrate on the role of government regulations (Prescott, 1998), human
capital (Benhabid and Spiegel, 2005), or institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002).
3This observation is well paraphrased by Aghion et al. (2005): "The modern theory of business cycles gives
a central position to productivity shocks and the role of nancial markets in the propagation of these shocks; but
it takes the entire productivity process as exogenous. The modern theory of growth, on the other hand, gives a
central position to endogenous productivity growth and the role of nancial markets in the growth process; but
it focuses on trends, largely ignoring shocks and cycles."
2tax on productivity-enhancing investments. The short-run non-neutrality of monetary policy
induces an investment composition eect that is found to be associated with changes in the
aggregate stock of technologies in the long-run. Hence, the model postulates a novel aspect
of monetary transmission in that dierences in the level of ination across countries or time
periods induce long-run dierences in TFP-growth as long as nancial markets are incomplete.
Our empirical macroeconomic evidence demonstrates the robustness of this negative em-
pirical relation. We apply a dynamic panel technique following Blundell and Bond (1998)
which allows some inspection of causality. Accordingly, we nd that ination reduces long-run
TFP-growth, whereby its exogeneity can not be rejected. Furthermore, the rm-level moral
hazard problem results in a constrained-ecient contracting scheme between rms and nan-
cial intermediaries. This endogenous form of nancial market incompleteness allows for a set
of empirical implications which are specic to our model. We test these implications using
disaggregated U.S. sectoral and rm-level panel data. The results demonstrate that rms with
riskier cash-ows and higher R&D investments systematically adjust the composition of their
asset and investment portfolios in periods of higher ination. In particular, we nd that (i) the
sensitivity of TFP-growth with respect to ination is signicantly higher in more volatile and
more productive sectors, (ii) periods of higher ination restrain rm-level R&D investments by
reducing corporate liquidity holdings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on
ination and long-run economic growth. Section 3 examines the aggregate empirical relation
between ination and long-run TFP-growth. The next two sections describe the theoretical
model as the basic structure to highlight the novel monetary transmission mechanism. In section
6, we test model-specic implications applying sectoral and rm-level panel data in order to
identify the underlying microeconomic mechanism empirically. A nal section concludes.
2 Literature review
A limited number of theoretical studies allow for an impact of changes in nominal variables
on long-run economic growth. In this regard, King et al. (1988) incorporate constant returns
to capital in a real business cycle model showing that temporary nominal shocks can have
permanent eects due to a reduction in capital investments. Similarly, Aizenman and Marion
(1993) develop a negative relation between nominal uctuations and GDP-growth due to the
existence of investment irreversibility. More recently, Fatas (2001) relates long-run growth
to short-run business cycles. He embeds an aggregate demand externality in an endogenous
growth model to show that the coordination of productive investments across dierent sectors
may be an important prerequisite for aggregate economic development. In contrast to our
contribution, the permanent eects in the above models are transmitted via the aggregate
quantity of investments, instead of their quality. However, Ramey and Ramey (1995) reveal
that the negative empirical correlation between nominal macroeconomic uctuations and the
trend of GDP-growth is independent of the aggregate quantity of investments which contradicts
the predictions of the above models.
Aghion et al. (2005) and Angeletos (2006) focus on the link between nancial market
incompleteness and business cycle uctuations. The former examine how (exogenous) credit
constraints aect the cyclical behavior of productivity-enhancing investment. Specically, they
3distinguish between a short-term and a long-term investment project which enhances future
productivity. Survival of long-term projects is uncertain because they are subject to idiosyn-
cratic liquidity shocks which - for reasons left unspecied - can only be imperfectly insured.
The authors show that suciently tight credit constraints result in a procyclicality of long-term
investment which amplify the business cycle. Similarly, Angeletos (2006) studies the eects of
idiosyncratic investment risk on the aggregate level and the allocation of savings within the
framework of a non-monetary neoclassical growth model. Their key result is that incomplete
markets reduce TFP by shifting resources away from the more risky, but also more productive
private equity investment. Both Aghion et al. (2006) and Angeletos (2007) are concerned with
real general equilibrium economies; they do not address a potential interplay between nominal
and nancial frictions. Moreover, they focus on the impact of exogenous credit constraints on
an economy's cyclical productivity dynamics and not on the evolution of the long-run trend. In
order to better understand the determinants of the interaction between nominal and nancial
frictions, it is important to carefully specify the source of market incompleteness which gives
rise to uninsured idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, we embed the nancial contracting problem
discussed in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) in our model. This endogenous form of nancial
market incompleteness makes it possible to derive a number of theoretical predictions which
can be examined empirically.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), among others, develop a theoretical link between the degree
of nancial market development and long-term growth. Their reasoning is based on the ability
of agents to share the risk of investment projects. Thus, capital investments in poor economies
are constraint by risk diversication opportunities. The model explains why the level and
volatility of output are high in less developed countries and decline with the degree of nancial
market development. Moreover, Levine et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence in favor of
a causal link from nancial development to economic growth. However, in contrast to these
approaches, we focus on the interplay between ination and nancial market frictions. That
is, incomplete nancial markets transmit short-run nominal constraints to long-run restrictions
on the productivity trend in our model.
The empirical literature on ination and growth employs cross-country (panel) regressions
with low frequency data.4 In this context, Bruno and Easterly (1998) and Easterly et al. (2005)
suggest that the negative relation between GDP-growth and ination is mainly due to ination
outliers. Assuming dierent threshold levels (e.g. 20%, 40%) they detect that the robustness
of the negative relation depends on high-ination countries. In contrast, Fischer (1993) nds
that the negative correlation between ination and TFP-growth is, if anything, larger in low-
ination (OECD-) countries. Moreover, Fischer investigates the causal mechanism behind
this correlation in several ways. First, he examines the potential endogeneity of ination by
considering sample variations across periods predominated by demand (1960-1972) or supply
(1973-1988) shocks.5 In line with the established literature, he starts from the presumption
that adverse supply shocks are the main source of the endogeneity of ination, i.e. while an
4Important contributions in this branch of research include De Gregorio (1992, 1993) and Barro (1996).
5The diculty in identifying a causal relation between ination and growth stems from the lack of appropriate
external instruments for ination. For cross-country regressions, a possible instrumental variable approach is due
to Cukierman et al. (1993) who incorporate measures of central bank independence as instrumental variables
and detect negative correlations with economic growth. Our own approach in Section 3 circumvents the problem
by applying dynamic panel regressions, thus relying on internal instruments whose validity is testable.
4adverse supply shock is inationary, an adverse demand shock would be deationary. However,
he nds that the correlation between ination and economic growth remains unchanged across
periods of mainly demand or supply shocks and therefore is led to the conclusion that ination
is exogenous with respect to growth. Second, the author decomposes GDP growth into its
components and detects a robust negative relation between ination the growth rate of TFP.
Thus, even after controlling for factor accumulation and employment, the negative eect of
ination on growth persists. It follows that there must be some ination-driven mechanism
which records in terms of decreased aggregate productivity growth.
The structure of the model we develop suggests that the availability of corporate liquidity
is a crucial determinant for rm-level qualitative investment decisions. To get some guidance
on the potential power of this mechanism, we relate our analysis to the ndings in Opler et
al. (1999) who examine the determinants and implications of holdings of cash and marketable
securities by publicly traded non-nancial U.S. rms.6 The authors establish that (i) rms with
better outside nancing opportunities tend to hold a lower fraction of their total assets in the
form of liquid assets, and that (ii) rms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash ows
hold relatively high ratios of cash to total non-cash assets.7 Moreover, there is evidence that
rms retain a relatively high fraction of their earnings as liquid reserves and that these reserves
are generally not used for capital investment, but rather tend to be depleted by operating losses,
i.e. the corporate liquidity is held as a hedge against production risk. As to the quantitative
importance of corporate cash holdings, the authors report the mean over the rms in their
sample of the ratio of cash to net assets to be 18%, while the median amounts to 6.5%. Thus,
corporate liquidity holdings are likely to constitute a quantitatively relevant expense factor in
the presence of ination.
3 Ination- TFP-growth nexus
Data and methodology: In this section, we complement the work of Fisher (1993) in that
we apply a dierent econometric method and supplementary robustness tests to investigate
the ination TFP-growth nexus. The aggregate empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced
panel data set consisting of 88 countries from 1970-1999. We employ non-overlapping 5-year
averages to smooth out business cycle eects which reduces the time dimension to six observa-
tions per country.8 Ination is measured by the rst dierence of the natural logarithm of the
real consumer price index from the World Development Indicator database (WDI). In addition,
we include various institutional and nancial control variables to minimize the potential of an
omitted variable bias. In particular, we approximate a country's degree of nancial market de-
velopment by the amount of private credits relative to GDP (credit).9 Furthermore, we account
6The background for most theoretical and empirical studies of corporate cash holdings is the presumption
that external nance is costly and that rms hold liquid assets in order to survive bad times and to have funds
readily available if an investment opportunity arises. The benets of corporate liquidity must then be balanced
against its costs which arises as a consequence of a liquidity premium.
7We interpret these latter features - high growth potential and risky cash ows - as the identifying charac-
teristics of what we label "advanced" technology.
8Specically, we use the following time averages: 1970-1974, 1075-1979, ..., 1995-1999.
9The proxy is obtained from from Beck and Levine (2000). We note that all of our results are robust to
the inclusion of alternative proxies from these authors such as the amount of liquid liabilities, the rate of stock
5for the following control variables: the government and private investment shares from the Penn
World Tables, the amount of trade in goods as % of GDP (WDI), the terms of trade (WDI), an
index of overall property rights from the Fraser Institute of Economic Freedom database, and
a measure of ination uncertainty. We construct the TFP series following Caselli (2006). A
detailed description of the growth accounting methodology is provided in the appendix A.5. In
line with the empirical growth literature, we include the lagged level of TFP as a lagged depen-
dent variable in the growth regression.10 Accordingly, we apply a dynamic panel data model.
Therefore, we employ the method developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) which is based on
the general method of moments (GMM) and is constructed to yield consistent estimates in
dynamic panels.11 This procedure instruments predetermined and endogenous variables with
the suitable corresponding lags of these variables. It allows to gain inspection of causality and
provides a tests of autocorrelation and overidentifying restrictions to check for the validity of
the instruments.
Results: In Table 2, we investigate the reduced-form relation between the two aggregate
series controlling for spurious correlation and endogeneity of ination. The rst column reports
a negative contemporaneous correlation between ination and TFP-growth after controlling
for the institutional and nancial indicators. Correspondingly, this negative correlation does
not simply capture an economy's degree of nancial or institutional development. In the next
column, we apply the least square dummy variable estimator to additionally control for country
xed eects. The coecient of ination is still signicant on a 1% level. Yet, the corresponding
estimates are biased in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Therefore, we present
our preferred specication based on the method of Blundell and Bond (1998) in column three.
Accordingly, ination, which is instrumented by its suitable own lags, reduces TFP-growth.
The corresponding coecient is signicant on a 1% level.12 Thus, our results suggest that
causation is running from ination to TFP-growth. Moreover, TFP-growth is decreasing in the
lagged level of TFP and increasing in the measure of overall property rights. The Hansen test
market trade, or the amount of nancial deposits. The results are available from the authors upon request.
10The corresponding coecient is negative and signicant on a 1% level in all estimation specications.
Compare e.g. Calder on and Serv en (2005) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Aghion et al. (2006) for
analogous approaches.
11In other words, considering the following dynamic panel data model in rst dierences:
yi;t   yi;t 1 = (yi;t 1   yi;t 2) + (Xi;t   Xi;t 1) + (i;t   i;t 1); i = 1;2;:::;N;t = 3;4;:::;T;
the basic assumptions of Arellano and Bond (1991) are E[yi;t s(i;t   i;t 1)] = 0, E[Xi;t s(i;t   i;t 1)] =
0 for s  2;t = 3;:::T, where yi;t is the dependent variable, Xi;t a vector of endogenous and exogenous
explanatory variables, N the number of cross-sections, T the number of time-periods, i;t the error term and
 and  parameters to be estimated. In addition, Blundell and Bond (1998) apply supplementary moment
restrictions on the original model in levels, whereby lagged dierences are used as additional instruments for
the endogenous and predetermined variables in levels. Given that E[yi;t;i] is mean stationary, the Blundell
and Bond (1998) estimator incorporates the additional moment restrictions E[(yi;t 1   yi;t 2)(i + i;t)] = 0,
E[(Xi;t 1   Xi;t 2)(i + i;t)] = 0, which requires the additional assumption of no correlation between the
dierences of these variables and the country-specic eect. The authors show that this procedure is more
ecient if explanatory variables are persistent.
12We stress that the average eect of a 1% point increase is relatively small since some countries experienced
excessive ination rates. In particular, ination varies from 0-6000% while TFP-growth varies from -10-10% in
our sample. This reduces the average marginal eect of a 1% point increase substantially. We outline below
that the average marginal eects are much larger if we focus on the OECD sub-sample or U.S. time series data.
6and the test of second order autocorrelation signalize that the validity of the instruments can
not be rejected.
In the remaining columns of Table 2, we conduct several robustness checks for our basic
specication. Column four reveals that an increase in the private investment share enhances
TFP-growth. However, the corresponding coecient of ination is still signicant on a 5%
level even after controlling for the uctuations in aggregate investments. We infer that the
transmission channel of ination is independent from private factor accumulation. This result
arms our conjecture that ination aects the quality (composition) of private investments
instead of their quantity.13 Column ve shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of
time xed eects which control for aggregate shocks that are common for all countries in each
time period. In column six and seven, we try to discriminate empirically between level and
uncertainty eects of ination. Therefore, we incorporate the standard deviation of ination as
a proxy for ination uncertainty.14 The standard deviation signicantly reduces TFP-growth if
we abstract from level eects. Yet, we exclusively nd a signicant negative eect of the level
of ination if we account for both uncertainty and level eects. However, we note that the
level and the standard deviation of ination are highly correlated in our sample. Nevertheless,
these results suggest that the distorting impact of ination is due to movements in the level
of ination instead of changes in ination uncertainty. Finally, the last column of Table 2
displays the results for the sub-sample of 22 OECD countries. Accordingly, a 5% increase in
ination reduces TFP-growth in this sub-set of developed economies, on average, by .35% in
the same time period.15 The negative coecient is signicant on a 1% level. The coecient in
the OECD sub-set is more pronounced since many countries suered from periods of excessive
ination which reduces the marginal eect of a 1% point increase in ination if we consider
the full sample. This result supports the hypothesis that ination reduces TFP-growth even
in regions/periods of moderate or low ination. Summing up, the aggregate results highlight
a negative empirical relation between ination and TFP-growth in the data with causality
running from the former to the latter.
4 The model
In this section, we introduce an endogenous growth model which accounts for short-run nominal
and nancial frictions to illuminate the long-run negative causation running from ination to
TFP-growth. The economy is populated by two sets of agents, households and entrepreneurs,
each of unit mass. Moreover, there are a nancial intermediation and a productive sector. The
latter is organized in decentralized rms, which have access to two distinct technologies: a
"basic" technology which is return-dominated but risk-free and a more productive but risky
"advanced" technology.16 There exist various interpretations of what the two types of invest-
13This result is in line with the earlier ndings of Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion et al. (2005) on
(nominal) volatility and GDP-growth.
14Uncertainty is measured as the average annual standard deviation for a corresponding 5-year-interval.
15A 1% increase in ination reduces the average annual U.S. TFP-growth by .4% if we exclusively focus on
yearly U.S. time series data from 1975-2000. In this case, we employ the rst two lags of ination as instruments
for the contemporaneous levels. The results are available from the authors upon request.
16As a general rule, variables pertaining to the basic sector are indicated by the variable/superscript k, while
z is the relevant indicator for the advanced sector.
7ments represent. For example, the basic project might reect investments in machines of the
same vintage relative to previous ones, while the advanced project might represent investments
in R&D, the learning a new skill, or the adoption of a new technology.17 The timing structure
underlying our model is as follows. Time is discrete, and within each period t, there are three
points in time: one at the beginning of the period, denoted t , one at an interim stage when
government policy materializes and information about it is revealed, and nally one at the end
of the period, denoted t+. Monetary policy, which is perfectly observable before individual
decisions are realized each period, is the only source of aggregate uncertainty since we focus
on the ination-growth nexus. Apart, there exist purely idiosyncratic liquidity shocks i
t to
the subset of rms operating the advanced technology. We now turn to a detailed description
of the environment in which the economy's agents interact and dene their relevant decision
problems as well as the long-run balanced growth path of the economy.
4.1 Households
The economy is populated by a unit mass of innitely-lived, risk averse households.18 House-
holds enter a given period t with a nominal wealth position Mt. At time t , households divide
their nominal wealth into resources Qt disposable for consumption later in the period and de-
posits Mt Qt with a nancial intermediary that earn a net interest rate ( ~ Rt 1).19 Thus, there
is a cash constraint on the goods market with the consequence that the household's current ex-
penditure for consumption cH
t must be covered by the resources Qt. After aggregate shocks have
unfolded, households rent out their sector-specic physical capital to the rms which operate
a portfolio of projects using the basic and advanced technology, respectively. Moreover, they
supply their labor inelastically. That is, each household is endowed with a constant amount
of labor which can be used for either of the two intermediate sectors, whereby households are
indierent as to the sectoral composition of their labor supply. Hence, the constant aggregate







t . Households are indierent as
to where their labor is employed. As an equilibrium consequence, the sectoral wage rates must
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t . At time t+, households receive the returns from labor
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t ) and capital (R
k;z
t ) and make their consumption decisions. The household has preferences
















and an equation describing the evolution of nominal assets:
17Similarly, the basic project might be putting money into the current business, while the advanced reects
the start-up of a new business. See Aghion et al. (2005) for further discussion.
18Where necessary, variables pertaining to the household sector will be denoted with a superscript H.
19This timing convention is standard in monetary models which feature a cash-in-advance constraint on the
household side; compare e.g. Lucas (1990). Our timing convention necessitates a careful treatment of the
information sets relevant to the household when it takes decisions. Specically, there is a distinction between
expectation operators at the beginning of a period (time t ) and at the end of a period (time t+).
8Mt+1 = Qt   Ptc
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where Jt are cash injections into the nancial market on behalf of the government and t
are nominal resources redistributed in a lump sum fashion among the consumers at the end of
the period, and subject to a law of motion for physical capital xt = kt + zt, which accounts for
depreciation:
xt = (kt+1 + zt+1)   (1   )(kt + zt) (1d)
The solution to the household problem can be summarized by a set of optimality conditions
which characterize the household's equilibrium behavior. The rst one is the Euler equation












Equation (2) implies a type of Fisher relation in that the nominal interest rate is a function
of the rate of ination and the real interest rate in equilibrium. The latter is in turn governed by
the balanced growth rate of consumption and parameters of the utility function. Next, there are
two Euler equations which determine the sequence of dynamic decisions between consumption
and sector-specic investments; for i = k;z:
uc(c
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Pt+1 is the real rental rate of capital in sector i in period (t + 1). An immediate





Apart from households, there is a unit mass of risk neutral entrepreneurs, each one capable
of running a specic project associated with the advanced production technology.20 At the
beginning of each period, a mass (1 ) of new-born entrepreneurs enters the economy without
any initial wealth and replaces an equal measure of retiring entrepreneurs.21 The remaining
measure  of incumbent entrepreneurs stays active. An individual entrepreneur arrives in
period t with an amount Ai
t of nominal wealth. Then, if she receives a random exit signal,
she waits until the end of the period to simply consume her accumulated wealth such that
20Apart from the fact that investments in the advanced project might represent investments in human capital,
we do not consider limitations in that production factor. Yet, a straightforward way to think about restrictions in
the economy's endowment of human capital (in our model) is an endogenous mass of risk neutral entrepreneurs,
which are capable of running the advanced project.




t . In contrast, new entrants and entrepreneurs who have not received the exit signal






t = 1 and thus augments her nominal wealth Ai
t by her
current wage earnings W E
t . Hence, an individual entrepreneur's eective wealth position is
Ei
t = Ai
t + W E
t . This position Ei
t constitutes the entrepreneur's necessary private equity stake
when she applies for funding of an advanced sector project with the nancial intermediary.
4.3 Financial intermediary
The nancial intermediary (equivalently, a perfectly competitive nancial sector) receives the
time t  nancial deposits Mt  Qt from the households as well as lump sum cash injections Jt
from the monetary authority. These funds are supplied to the loan market at a gross nominal
interest rate ~ Rt. At the loan market, this supply meets the demand for nominal nancial assets
coming from the demand for liquidity Dt of rms operating the advanced technology. Hence,
nancial market clearing requires:
Mt   Qt + Jt = Dt (4)
This condition simply stipulates that the equilibrium interest rate ~ Rt balances the supply of
loans with the corporate demand for funds due to its need for liquidity. The nancial intermedi-
ary operates after monetary policy is resolved and lends liquidity to the advanced sector rms.
Yet, the provision of funds to advanced projects is complicated by an entrepreneurial moral
hazard problem which is dealt with by a nancial contract described in Section 4.5. Two key
implication of that contracting scheme are that rm bankruptcy is an equilibrium phenomenon
and that the intermediary must commit funds to individual advanced sector projects before
these projects' respective liquidity needs are known. Therefore, it is important to recognize
that the nancial intermediary is able to pool idiosyncratic risks across the advanced sector
rms. As a consequence, it is sucient for the nancial intermediary to break even on an indi-
vidual credit relationship in expectation. At the end of the period, the intermediary receives the
returns on its lending and nancial investment activity and pays the amount ~ Rt[Mt  Qt +Jt]
to the households in return for their deposits.
4.4 Firms
In our economy, production activities proceed in two dierent steps. First, investments in basic
and advanced technologies results in two dierent types of intermediate goods (yk
t ;yz
t). Second,
the two types of intermediates are combined to produce the nal market good (yt) that is used
for consumption purposes. In all three goods markets, rms face perfect competition.
4.4.1 Market good



















10where the two parameters 0 <  < 1 and  > 0 determine the share of each intermediate
good in producing the aggregate market good and the elasticity of substitution of the two
factors.
Productive eciency pins down the minimum cost combination of the nal good rms'
demands for intermediate input goods to be functions of the relative prices for the relevant
intermediate input P
j


















By perfect competition on the nal goods market, the aggregate price level is determined
by marginal costs, i.e. the intermediate good prices, which are constant from the nal good















There are two perfectly competitive sectors producing intermediate goods. Both sectors employ
capital as well as labor as input goods, but are characterized by dierent technologies. On the
one hand, there is a safe, but return-dominated ("basic") technology; the other ("advanced")
technology yields a higher potential return, but is subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
The scope for an individual advanced rm's insurance against this idiosyncratic liquidity risk is
endogenously determined via the nancial contract described in Section 4.5. The need for this
insurance arises as a consequence of an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem which prevents
the ecient renancing of advanced projects and calls for the commitment of liquidity at an ex
ante, rather than an ex post stage. A natural way to think about advanced technology projects
are investments in R&D or the adoption of new (foreign) technologies. We assume, in accor-
dance with the literature on endogenous growth, that investments in the advanced technology
involve spill-overs to the future stock of knowledge (Tt).22 Consequently, aggregate productivity
has two components: an exogenous and an endogenous one. The exogenous productivity pa-
rameters dier in both sectors, whereby the productivity of the advanced technology is strictly
larger than the basic one by denition (V > A). We abstract from variations in the exogenous
productivity parameters over time since we focus on the growth-eect of short-run nominal
uctuations instead of technology-induced cycles. In addition to the exogenous components of
productivity, there is an endogenous one. The endogenous component Tt, which we call the
level of knowledge, augments the productivity of both projects; the determination of Tt will be
described later. Note that the advanced sector is characterized by perfect competition. Hence,
investments in R&D take place not because of a monopolistic market structure, but due to
the incentives for rms to optimize the composition of their investments. That is, the risk
associated with R&D investments combined with the nancial market incompleteness limit the
capacity of R&D ex ante. Consequently, as opposed to the endogenous growth literature  a la
Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992), the key feature of R&D is not the creation of
22Compare Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992). It does not matter in our framework if the spill-overs
reect actual investments in R&D or the scope of the advanced technology for accidental learning-by-doing.
11monopoly rents, but its superior productivity combined with the risk associated to it.
Basic sector: Firms in the basic sector seek to maximize time t+ prots by hiring labor
and capital inputs flk
t;ktg, whereby the vector of prices fP k
t ;W k
t ;Rk
t; ~ Rtg is taken as given.
A Cobb-Douglas aggregator converts household and entrepreneurial labor inputs into their


























The technology characterizing the basic intermediate sector is assumed to be homogenous









































By constant returns to scale, ecient factor employment implies that marginal costs are
independent of the quantity produced, i.e. C(W k
t ;Rk
t;yk




t . Then, from
the assumption of perfectly competitive intermediate goods markets, it follows that the price





Cobb-Douglas specication of '(kt;lk
































Advanced sector: The problem of rms operating the advanced technology is complicated
by the risk that their production plan is hit by a liquidity shock23 which may trigger the
23The liquidity shock admits a variety of interpretations. It can be thought of a simple cost overrun, as a
shortfall of revenue at an interim stage which could have been used as an internal source of renancing, as
adverse information relating to the project's end-of-period protability, an extra cost to familiarize the workers
with the new technologies, or as an extra costs necessary for the new technology to be adapted to domestic
market conditions once the new technology has been adopted. Hence, we stress that our notion of liquidity
shock is consistent with what Opler et al. (1999) empirically summarize under the heading of operating losses.
12termination of productive projects before they yield any return. We assume that all advanced
projects feature an ex post positive net present value if the entrepreneur has exerted eort.
As in the basic sector, there is a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of the respective labor inputs by
households and entrepreneurs, and the technology in the advanced sector is also given by a








Each advanced rm is run by an individual entrepreneur who brings the amount Ei
t as
private equity into the rm. The rm's production plan and its hedge against liquidity shocks
i
t, which are distributed according to a continuous distribution function G(i
t) with associated
(strictly positive) density g(i
t), are then determined as part of a constrained-ecient contract
between the entrepreneur and the nancial intermediary. In particular, the liquidity provision
stipulated by the nancial contract will be seen to pin down a threshold value ^ 
t up to which
liquidity shocks are covered; this threshold, in turn, determines an individual advanced rm's
ex ante survival probability G(^ 
t). Since the nancial contract, derived in Section 4.5, turns
out to be linear in Ei
t, the distribution of equity across entrepreneurs does not matter and exact
aggregation is possible.24 Hence, we anticipate results and note in analogy to the basic sector





















The details of the nancial contract are described in the next section.
4.5 Financial contracting
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we now turn to a detailed analysis of the contracting
problem which is specic to the advanced technology. In principle, all investment projects might
face constraint nancing opportunities. In this respect, the exact identifying assumption in our
model is that the riskiness of an investment project is, on average, increasing in its productivity.
However, we separate the technology choices into two classes according to their productiveness
whereas the riskiness of less productive projects is normalized to zero to simplify the analysis
of our model. The sequencing of events underlying an individual advanced rm's within-period
contracting problem can be decomposed into three stages.25
At stage one, after information about monetary policy (Jt) is unveiled, each advanced
rm, run by an entrepreneur holding an equity position Et in the rm, contracts with the
nancial intermediary to pin down its production plan and renancing provisions.26 In particu-
lar, the renancing provisions determine the degree of insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity
24From now on, we will therefore drop the superscript i.
25Although the rm's production plan is conditional on the predetermined entrepreneurial equity position Et,
the rm problem itself is not dynamic because entrepreneurial asset accumulation proceeds mechanically and
there is no inter-temporal incentive provision.
26We assume that entrepreneurial self-nancing is not possible; a sucient condition for this to be the case
is derived in the appendix.
13risk.27 Thereafter, a contract between the nancial intermediary (outside investor) and the
entrepreneur (rm) holding equity Et prescribes (i) the scale of production as determined by
factor employment zt, lz
t, (ii) a state contingent continuation rule  t(t), and (iii) a state con-
tingent transfer t(t) from the rm to the investor. Hence, a generic contract takes the form
Ct = fzt;lz
t; t(t);t(t)g. A constraint on the contract is that it is written under limited lia-
bility, i.e. in case of project termination factors must be remunerated by the outside investor.
At a subsequent interim stage (stage two) after the factor employment decisions have been
made, the rm is hit by an idiosyncratic liquidity shock t. If the shock is met by appropriate
renancing to be provided by the intermediary, the rm can continue; otherwise the rm is
liquidated.28 After the continuation decision, there is scope for moral hazard on the part of
the entrepreneur in that she can exert eort to aect the distribution of production outcomes.
Specically, we dene that, conditional on continuation, exerting eort guarantees a gross return
of P z
t TtVf(zt;lz
t) = P z
t ~ yz
t to production activity, while shirking leads to zero output, but gener-
ates a private (non-monetary) benet Bt. We assume that the private benet is proportional
to rm revenue conditional on survival; in particular, we have: Bt = bP z
t TtVf(zt;lz
t) = bP z
t ~ yz
t
with 0 < b < 1.29 Finally, at stage three, the revenue from production accrues and payos are
realized according to the rules stipulated in the nancial contract. The nancial intermediary
engages in a continuum of contracts with advanced sector rms; hence, since liquidity risk
is idiosyncratic, the intermediary is able to pool the risk inherent in the investments across
individual rms' projects. As an implication, we can completely abstract from the eects of id-
iosyncratic uncertainty on the investor's evaluation of payos. Similarly, the entrepreneur who
is exposed to her uninsured private equity risk is risk neutral and cares only about expected
prots as long as she is active.
Hypothetically abstracting from both the entrepreneurial incentive constraint and the cost
of obtaining liquidity at the interim stage, it is easy to see that there exists a unique cuto
value of one corresponding to a continuation policy which prescribes project continuation if
and only if the liquidity shock is such that   1. The reason is that the stage one investment
is sunk; hence, at the interim stage, it is optimal to renance up to the full value of what can
be generated in terms of revenue at the nal stage. However, the need to take into account the
incentive constraint and the costs of liquidity provision implies that the constrained-ecient
continuation policy will take the form:
 t(t) =

1; if t  ^ t
0; if t > ^ t
for some cuto value ^ t < 1. Hence,  t(t) is a simple indicator function with  t(t) = 1 in
case of continuation and  t(t) = 0 in case of termination.
27It is important to realize that the nancial contract is negotiated after fresh cash Jt has been injected into
the economy. Consequently, the results of monetary policy that we will develop in the sequel do not stem from
an implicit nominal rigidity. On the contrary, our concept of corporate liquidity is entirely real; what is aected
by nominal uctuations, however, is the price of such liquidity.
28We assume that the liquidity shock is veriable, but it is shown in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) that
nothing changes if only the rm observes the shock as long as the rm does not benet from diverting resources.
29Note, however, that the specic value of b > 0 will not matter as long as the contract to be derived below
delivers an interior solution.
14A constrained-ecient contract Ct = fzt;lz
t; t(t);t(t)g with (zt;lz
t) determining the scale
of production, and  t(t) and t(t) pinning down the state contingent policies for project
continuation and transfers per unit of production costs C (W z
t ;Rz
t; ~ yz
t), respectively, then solves














t)gdG(t)   Et (12a)





















t)   Et (12b)






































are the associated total costs which accrue when a output level of ~ yz
t is targeted in case of
survival.
Note how the specication of this problem, by means of the participation constraint (12b),
incorporates the requirement that the investor who bears the risk of project failure be willing
to nance the rm, whereby the outside investor commits both the factor remuneration and
the interim resources needed to meet the liquidity shock. The cost of providing liquidity at the
interim stage, which has to be obtained in the nancial market at the nancial rate ~ Rt, will be
key in shaping the solution to problem (12).
The algebraic solution to the optimal contract dened in (12) is provided in the appendix
A.1. Intuitively, the constraint optimal contract implies that the rm is the residual claimer of
the return of investment given that the outside investor breaks even in expectations. Thus, the
rm wants to maximize the initial scale of investment. If we dene ^ 0
t = 1 b
~ Rt as the cuto value
that maximizes the expected marginal return to outside investors, it follows that the optimal
cuto value, which denes the equilibrium provision of liquidity at the interim stage, must be
in the interval ^ 
t 2 [^ 0
t; ^ FB
t ]. That is, if t < ^ 0
t, then both parties prefer to continue ex post
because both parties can realize gains on the investment in the sunk stage one; if t > ^ FB
t , then
both parties prefer to abandon the project because the net social marginal return of continuing
15is negative. Within the interval [^ 0
t; ^ FB
t ], there emerges a trade-o: On the one hand, increasing
^ t implies that continuation is possible in more contingencies, and thus the marginal net social
return t(^ t) on each unit of initial investment is increased. On the other hand, decreasing ^ t
allows to increase the amount of initial investment MCz
t ()~ yz
t.
The solution of the constraint ecient contract results in an the optimal continuation value
^ 












This condition reects that the maximum equilibrium provision of liquidity must coincide
with the adjusted markup on advanced sector output prices, whereas the adjustment represents
the cost of providing liquidity which is given by the nominal interest rate ( ~ Rt).
Hence, second best contracting is indeed consistent with liquidity holdings at the rm level,
whereby the nominal interest rate ~ Rt reects the shadow price for such scarce liquidity. More-
over, we can derive a measures of aggregate liquidity demand under nancial intermediation













t <  Dt (14)
Thus, the second best liquidity demand under nancial intermediation, which eciently
economizes on the use of scarce liquidity by pooling liquidity risk across rms, falls below the
demand that results from a policy which disregards the scope for risk sharing across rms.
4.6 Empirical implications
As an immediate consequence of optimal nancial contracting as derived in Section 4.5 and
A.1, we put on record the following empirical implications of optimal nancial contracting as
governed by equation (13), which will be subject of our later empirical analysis of industry and
rm-level panel data.












which follows from total dierentiation of condition (13).





t remains constant. That is, the results derived
in the following are valid from a partial equilibrium perspective; taking into account general equilibrium eects
does not change the qualitative (sign) properties of the relevant derivatives. However, to obtain a closed-form
solution, we have to determine a functional form of G(). It is shown in the appendix A.4 that the general
equilibrium eect is negative if G0 > 0.
16Thus, quite intuitively, higher nominal interest rates ~ Rt lead to smaller hedging against
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks because the intermediary's participation constraint gets tighter
in line with the increased costs of providing liquidity. In order to examine the eects of other
changes in the economic environment on rms' liquidity demand, we establish two auxiliary
results.
First, increased volatility of the liquidity shock distribution G() in the sense of a mean-




d < 0.31 The intuition behind
this result is that increased risk makes the option to terminate the project more valuable. The
empirical prediction therefore is that rms operating in a more volatile environment are insured
to a smaller degree.
 H2: Increased production risk (in the form of a mean-preserving spread of the distribution






















where the inequality follows from the fact that ^ 
t is decreasing in the volatility of the shock
distribution and dierentiation of expression (15) with respect to ^ 
t.
Second, situations where production by means of the advanced technology is more prof-











t ) > 0.32 The reason for the poorer insurance of more protable projects is
the contracting trade-o underlying the choice of ^ 
t: While a more generous provision with
liquidity has the advantage of withstanding larger shocks, it necessarily implies a lower stage
one investment volume. Thus, for highly protable projects, both contracting parties prefer
to cut ^ 
t in order to expand the project size. Based on these results, we can derive two addi-
tional hypotheses relating to the sensitivity of specic rms (or industries) to uctuations in
the nominal interest rate.


























where the inequality follows from the fact that ^ 
t is increasing in the marginal-cost-to-price
ratio and dierentiation of expression (15) with respect to ^ 
t.
31Variations in the standard deviation  need to be restricted to mean-preserving spreads, the result then
obtains by partial integration; compare Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), chapter 6.
32This follows from total dierentiation of condition (13), for given ~ Rt.
174.7 Endogenous technical change
In this section, we describe the endogenous part of the productivity processes - the dynamics
of Tt. As mentioned above, we assume that the advanced projects (yz
t) generate spill-overs on
the future stock of knowledge since they embody investments in R&D, skills or the adoption of























where 0 <   1 represents the fraction of investments in the advanced technology that
involve knowledge spill-overs.
The law of motion species that productivity growth is increasing in productivity-enhancing
investments, whereby we suppose that only successful advanced investment projects create
productivity spill-overs proportional to the contemporaneous stock of knowledge.33 Note that
the specication in (18a) is essentially the same as the corresponding ones in the endogenous
growth literature: the rate of technical change is governed by investments in R&D, which, in
our model, are part of the investments in the advanced sector.34 More specically, we suppose
that investments in R&D consist of expenses for research labor and capital (e.g. research lab)
which are combined in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. Hence, given V, A and an initial level T0,
the current realization of the TFP-level depends on all successful past realizations of advanced
investment projects. Consequently, it depends on past degrees of nancial development and, if
nancial markets are incomplete, also on past realizations of ination.
Note that an increase in the stock of knowledge/technology enhances the productivity in
both sectors since we suppose that the new technology is not skill biased - it can be adopted
for both types of projects.
4.8 Government policy
In order to close the model, a specication for government policy is needed. We suppose that
government policy is governed by an exogenous process which consists of periodic injections
Jt of money in the nancial market. Jt is implicitly dened as Jt = (emgt   1)(Mt + At),
where mgt is the gross rate of money growth. Hence, the aggregate of nominal wealth held by
households and entrepreneurs is updated according to:
(Mt+1 + At+1) = e
mgt (Mt + At):
33Note that terminated advanced projects are liquidated before the entrepreneur exerts any eort (moral
hazard). Thus, it is assumed that these failed projects do not cause any knowledge externality.
34Compare Romer (1990) or Aghion and Howitt (1992).
185 Long-run balanced growth path
In this section, we demonstrate that the equilibrium growth rate along the long-run balanced
growth path is negatively related to the ination rate. The important result of the analysis
shows that this is due to a compositional eect between investment into the basic sector and
investment into the advanced project.
Our setup allows to dene a set of aggregate relations characterizing a competitive equilib-
rium in each period. The denition is given in Appendix A.3 and the corresponding competitive
equilibrium relations are derived in Appendix A.2. The long-run dynamics of the model are
fully governed by the law of motion of the endogenous stock of technologies in (18a) because









where yz = e yzG(^ ) is the aggregate level of (realized) output in the advanced sector.35 In
particular, (18a) concatenates a sequence of competitive equilibrium relations that we use in
the following in order to demonstrate the negative relationship between the long-run equilibrium
growth rate and the level of ination. As a consequence, we need to solve for the impact of
the variables in our model on the scale of successful advanced investment projects in order to
analyze the determinants of the long-run balanced growth path. The analysis of the impact of
ination on the growth rate is carried out in three steps: First, we show that a drop in the cuto
value for the optimal liquidity provision ^  leads to a compositional change of aggregate output
towards the good produced in the basic sector. Second, as already emphasized by hypothesis
(H1), an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the optimal cuto value and hence
the insurance provided against idiosyncratic liquidity risk in the advanced sector. Moreover,
because the real rental rate of capital is increasing in the nominal interest rate, the aggregate
output level in the advanced sector is strictly falling in the nominal interest rate. Lastly it is
shown that the equilibrium level of the nominal interest rate itself is increasing in the ination
rate.
Along the balanced growth path, the rental rates of capital and the wages in both sectors
must be equal. Consequently, since both the basic technology and the advance technology
employ the identical composition of capital and labor as input factors, the associated total
costs in the advanced sector, which accrue when an output level of e yz is targeted in case of
survival, amount to V  g MC
z
= AMCk. Making use of the optimal input factor demands and







In other words, the markup of prices over marginal costs in the advanced sector is zero
due to perfect competition if we abstract from the liquidation risk in the advanced sector.
Hence, the productivity adjusted marginal costs in both sectors are equal in this case. If we
dierentiate (21) with respect to the cuto-value (^ ), we obtain the responsiveness of the
35In the discussion of the balanced growth path, we leave out time subscripts for notational convenience.
19intermediate output ratio with respect to changes in the insurance of corporate liquidity shocks










) > 0: (22)
Hence, the equilibrium ratio of investments in the advanced sector relative to the basic
sector is increasing in corporate liquidity holdings (^ ). Intuitively, relatively more projects
fail in the advanced sector, on average, which reduces realized production since the projects
are insured at a lower level. In addition, this also leads to a reduction of investment into
the advanced technology as the advanced projects loose attractiveness in terms of expected
revenues as compared to the basic technology. Moreover, it follows from H1 that this ratio is
decreasing in the nominal interest rate ~ R. That is, less liquidity is devoted to the insurance of
the advanced projects since the costs of liquidity holdings increase.
Finally, we know that the aggregated output level (y) is decreasing in the nancial rate ( ~ R)
since on the one hand the real rental rate of capital increases in the nancial rate ~ R and on
the other hand labor is constant.36 Because the nominal interest rate ~ R reduces both, the ratio
(
yz





Therefore, taken together with (20), we infer that the equilibrium balanced growth rate is
strictly increasing in the provision of liquidity according to the nancial contract. An increase
in the amount of corporate liquidity holdings enhances economic growth (
d
d^  > 0). It follows
from (H1) that the long-run balanced growth rate is decreasing in the nominal interest rate
( ~ R). In fact, each level of the nominal interest rate implies a dierent long-run balanced
growth rate:  = ( ~ R). Importantly, this link between a nominal variable and TFP-growth
in the case of incomplete nancial markets is due to rm-level heterogeneity of investment
projects. The highlighted tradeo between risk and productivity in our framework yields an
investment composition eects that results lower aggregate growth rates for higher levels of the
nominal interest rate as emphasized in the following implication:
 I1: An increase in ~ R leads to a lower long-run balanced growth rate  by reducing the







Moreover, (2) implies a type of Fisher equation in equilibrium between the nominal interest
rate and the level of ination. In particular, we can re-write (2) as follows if the economy is in
a balanced growth equilibrium
36This can be easily demonstrated by making use of the two inter-temporal Euler equations for nominal
wealth (2) and physical capital accumulation (3).
20~ R = (): (25)
In (25),  = P0
P where P 0 denotes the price level in the next period. The deterministic
function () =
uc(cH)
uc(c0H) depicts the marginal rate of substitution along the long-run balanced
growth path. For a standard (strictly concave) utility function u(cH),  > 0. Total dierenti-









which is strictly positive by I1. It follows that higher rates of ination induce a higher
nominal interest rate if the economy is in a long-run balanced growth equilibrium. Conse-
quently, economies that feature a higher level of (trend) ination suer from reduced long-run
productivity growth. Similarly, periods of high ination within a country reduce productivity
growth while low-ination periods cause a transition to a higher balanced growth path.









Note that (20) implies that there exists a single long-run balanced growth rate in the (rst-
best) case of complete nancial markets (b = 0). In this case, the ex ante pledgeable unit return
complies with the ex post pledgeable unit return (^ FB
t = ^ 
t), so that all investments projects
in the advanced sector are re-nanced:
R ^ 
t
o G()d = 1. Not surprisingly, it follows that the
long-run balanced growth rate in a complete nancial market economy dominates the growth
rate in an economy that is characterized by incomplete markets. Yet, the empirical rm-level
evidence from Opler et al. (1999) suggests that rms require liquidity holdings in order to
invest in productive and risky projects even in the U.S. economy.
6 Empirical analysis
In this section, we employ disaggregate U.S. data to examine the specic microeconomic mech-
anism underlying our model. We do so in two steps, rst exploiting industry-level data and
then rm-level data.
6.1 Sectoral level
Data and methodology: Our model provides a set of rm-level predictions (H1 - H3). It is
straightforward to extend our one-sector model to a multi-sector setup, whereby each individual
industrial sector is a replica of the representative production structure described in Section 4.
21The economy-wide TFP measure T can then be interpreted as industry-specic productivity
measures, and the contracting implications H1 - H3 do apply not only for individual rms, but
also for industrial sectors. Hence, we can empirically test our hypotheses by means of industry-
level data. As an implication of H2, we hypothesize that the response in terms of the cuto
^  to movements in the nominal interest rate is stronger for rms operating in more volatile
industries. A positive correlation between the rate of ination and nominal interest rates and
the fact that a lower ^  ceteris paribus leads to lower TFP-growth (compare equation (27))
then together imply that the negative relation between TFP-growth and ination is expected
to be stronger in more volatile sectors. In addition, we presume that rms operating in more
productive sectors in terms of their historically realized TFP-growth have had access and are
more exposed to superior investment opportunities. For given ~ R, inspection of equation (30)
reveals a link between the technology V available to a rm and its protability Pz
MCz in case
of survival; the intuitive implication is that high productivity growth goes along with high
potential protability. Hence, from H3, protable rms operating in industries with high
realized productivity growth are expected to react more sensitively to higher ination.
We apply 3-digit industry-level data for the U.S. to investigate these hypotheses. The
productivity of U.S. industrial sectors is measured by the yearly growth rate of real value
added per industry from the UNIDO (2002) industrial statistics database. The yearly data
are available for 28 industries from 1963-2000.37 The classication of 3-digit U.S. industries
with respect to average volatility (standard deviation) and average growth of productivity in
our sample are reported in Table 5. The correlation coecient between these two rankings is
positive 0.23 (p   value = 0:03) and signicantly dierent from zero at a 1% level according
to Spearman's rank correlation test. Hence, an independence of both rankings is rejected
conrming that more volatile sectors are characterized by higher average productivity growth.38
Therefore, identifying (i) volatile and (ii) strongly growing sectors with industries that are
highly exposed to the advanced technology, we divide the sample according to the median,
the rst and the fourth quartile of both measures. According to our theoretical model, the
dierential impact of ination on TFP-growth across the relevant sub-samples should result
from the dierent sensitivity of corporate liquidity holdings in response to higher ination and
is expected to be more pronounced in the 14 (7) industries whose volatility/average productivity
growth is above the median (in the rst quartile).
We control for industry specic xed eects in all estimations. Since the rst lag of the
growth rate (or level) of value added is not signicant at conventional levels in any specication,
we employ a static panel estimation. That is, we estimate the following model:
yi;t =  + 1t 1 + 2(t 1  DVi) + 3Xt + i + i;t; i = 1;2;:::;N;t = 1;2;:::;T (28)
where yi;t is the growth rate of real value added per industry, t 1 the rst lag of ina-
tion, DVi a dummy which amounts to one for industries with an above median (rst quartile)
volatility/mean, Xt a vector of aggregate control variables, N = 28 the number of cross-sections,
T = 38 the number of time-periods, i industry specic xed eects,  the error term and 
37Moreover, we deate the value added series in each sector with the economy-wide GDP-deator.
38Among the ten most volatile sectors, we nd industries such as professional & scientic equipment, petroleum
reneries, plastic products, industrial chemicals, iron and steel or non-ferrous metals. In contrast, the four least
volatile sectors are food products, other chemicals, beverages and printing and publishing.
22and  parameters to be estimated.39
We cluster the error terms at the industry level so that the standard errors are robust to
within group (serial) correlation.40 Ination is measured as the change in the economy-wide
consumer price index. We include the rst lag of ination (L:infl) due to the potential endo-
geneity of contemporaneous measures. Apart, we include the contemporaneous level and the
rst lag of the growth rate of GDP (GDP  growth), the private investment share (inv share)
and the amount of overall credit (credit) as control variables. The latter variable is often used
as a proxy for the degree of nancial market development in the literature.
Results: The rst column in Table 9 reports the correlation between the rst lag of ina-
tion and the growth rate of real value added for the full sample. We nd that an 1% increase
in the economy-wide rate of ination triggers, on average, a drop in the sectoral growth rate of
real value added by .96% after controlling for changes in (lagged) GDP-growth, the private in-
vestment share and the overall supply of credits. The next two columns, contrast the sensitivity
of value added growth with respect to ination in high and low volatility sectors (above/below
median). In accordance with H2, we detect that the negative impact of ination is signicant
in both subsamples, but on average 61% higher in the 14 highly volatile sectors. In order to
test for a statistical signicance of the dierence between both coecient, we interact the lag of
ination with a dummy variable which amounts to one for high volatility industries (according
to the median) and zero otherwise. Column four reveals that the interaction is negative and sig-
nicant on a 10% level. That is, the distorting impact of an 1% increase in ination aggravates,
on average, by .32% if we focus on high volatility as opposed to low volatility sectors. This
eect is even more pronounced if we compare the sensitivity in the seven most volatile sectors
with the one in the residual 21 sectors. In particular, the sensitivity of value added growth per
industry with respect to ination is, on average, 76% higher in the seven most volatile sectors
(.62/.81). The dierence is signicant on a 5% level. Thus, we are able to link the ination-
sensitivity of sectoral TFP-growth to the average sectoral volatility of productivity growth per
industry. This systematic variation in the data is consistent with the prediction of our model
summarized in H2. Columns six to seven of Table 9 classify the impact of ination on produc-
tivity growth according to the median and rst quartile of the observed average productivity
growth of a given industry in the sample. In accordance with H3, column six reports that
the negative impact of ination is more pronounced in industries whose average productivity
growth is above the sample median. Yet, the dierence is not signicant at conventional levels.
Moreover, the coecient not signicant and even positive if we focus on the seven sectors that
experienced the highest average productivity increase in the sample.
Overall, the results emerging from the analysis of industry-level corroborate our theoretical
predictions that the negative eect of ination on TFP-growth varies systematically with the
riskiness as measured by the sectoral volatility of value added growth (H2) of investment port-
folios across sectors. In particular, we interpret these ndings as supportive for our theoretical
model's distinction between the basic technology, which is normalized to be free of liquidity
risk, and the advanced technology, where there is a superior growth potential, but where id-
iosyncratic liquidity shocks give rise to a corporate demand for (partial) insurance against such
39We also included a linear time trend, but it is not signicant at conventional levels. Moreover, the allowance
for year xed eects would have reduced the degrees of freedom considerably.
40Consequently, our results are not subject to the caveat raised by Moulton (1990).
23risk. In the next subsection, we will revisit the specic implications arising from this setup on
the basis of rm-level data.
6.2 Firm level
Data and methodology: Microeconomic data on rm-level behavior allow for a straightfor-
ward test of our specic theoretical mechanism. That is, our model predicts that corporate
liquidity holdings are associated with investments in superior technologies. Moreover, rms
react to an increase in ination (the nominal interest rate) by reducing their liquidity holdings
and by shifting their portfolio towards more secure investments (H1). In order to test these
hypotheses we employ U.S. rm-level data from Compustat. The data relate to the balance
sheets of U.S. nonnancial rms and cover the time period 1970-2000. We consider annual data
since we expect that rms frequently adjust their liquidity and investment portfolios to changes
in the cost of insurance.41 Overall, we have an unbalanced panel consisting of over 2000 rms.
We include the following rm level data: R&D expenses, the amount of cash and marketable se-
curities (corp:liquidity), the amount of total assets (assets), the operating income (opincome),
and the amount of retained earnings (reearn). All variables are measured in millions of dol-
lars. Corporate R&D investments are used as a proxy for investments in superior technologies.
The amount of cash and marketable securities approximate a rm's corporate liquidity hold-
ings. The other measures serve as control variables. In particular, we expect investments in
advanced technologies increase with the size of a rm (assets), its operating income and its
retained earnings. In addition, we use the rate of ination based on the U.S. consumer price
index to investigate the eect of this macroeconomic variable on rm-level liquidity and invest-
ment portfolios.42 We employ the GMM system estimator following Blundell and Bond (1998).
Note that the mix of macro- and microeconomic data allows for a direct inspection of causality.
In particular, the coecient of ination reects the causal impact on (marginal) R&D expenses
of a single rm since the latter has no feedback-eect on the aggregate level of ination.
We point out that the empirical evidence provided by Opler et al. (1999), which we out-
lined in section 2, already supports part of our specic microeconomic mechanism. That is, the
authors reveal that U.S. rms with higher growth opportunities, which are approximated by a
rm's market-to-book value as well as its R&D expenses, hold on average more liquid assets
(cash and marketable securities) relative to total assets. We see these empirical ndings as
strongly supportive of the relevance of corporate liquidity holdings for the purpose of insuring
superior production activities. In this regard, we extend the analysis in Opler et al. (1999)
by investigating the impact of ination on corporate cash holdings and rm level R&D expenses.
Results: The rst two columns of Table 4 conrm H1 which states that ination reduces
corporate liquidity holdings. Accordingly, a 1% point increase in ination reduces corporate
liquidity holdings, on average, by 2.4 million $ in the same year. The corresponding coecient
is signicant on a 1% level if we employ the GMM dierence estimator. Note that the long-
41We obtain qualitatively similar results if we focus on longer or shorter time horizons by applying 5-year
averages or quarterly data, respectively. The results are available from the authors upon request.
42We stress that our results based on the GMM system estimator do not suer from an aggregation bias, as
outlined by Moulton (1990), since we employ heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust standard errors
to avoid within-group correlation.
24run eect is even more pronounced in this dynamic model since a reduction in the dependent
variable further reduces future realization of corporate liquidity holdings. The corresponding
long-run eect of a 1% point increase in ination amounts to -9.74 million $.43 The negative
eect of an increase in ination is independent of variations in total assets, operating income,
retained earnings or rm xed eects. Column three and four of Table 4 display a negative
correlation between ination and rm-level R&D expenses after controlling for the other rm-
level variables. Interestingly, the coecient of ination declines substantially if we additionally
control for corporate liquidity holdings. Column ve and six report our preferred estimation
specication following Blundell and Bond (1998). We nd that rms reduce their investments
in R&D signicantly in years of higher ination. Accordingly, a 1% point increase in ination
reduces corporate R&D expenses, on average, by .19 million $ in the same year and by 8.8
million $ in the long-run. This distorting impact declines, on average, by 68% if we addi-
tionally control for corporate liquidity holdings. The resulting ination coecient is no longer
signicant at conventional levels. This nding reveals that the negative impact of ination
on rm-level R&D investments is transmitted via uctuations in corporate liquidity holdings
just like our theoretical mechanism suggest - compare H1 and I2. Moreover, in accordance
with Opler et al. (1999), we detect a strong positive correlation between corporate liquidity
holdings and R&D which is signicant at a 1% level. We reject the presence of second order
autocorrelation in all estimation specications and the Hansen test of overidentifying restric-
tions supports the validity of the instruments. Hence, the estimation specications appears
to be well specied.44 In the last two columns of Table 4, we include the overall corporate
level of investments instead of specic R&D investments as the dependent variable. Our model
predicts that only investments in the advanced technology are negatively aected by ination
or a reduction in corporate liquidity holdings. Indeed, the results show that ination does not
inuence the overall level of corporate investments. Similarly, they are also not aected by
the level of corporate liquidity holdings. Thus, the distorting impact of ination is specic to
investments in advanced technologies. Finally, note that the systematic pattern of correlation
between corporate investments decisions and ination after controlling for other rm charac-
teristics, which is specic to investments in R&D, clearly suggests that the negative ination
coecient is not just picking up time eects. Instead, there appears to be a systematic variation
in the data supporting our hypotheses.
Summing up, the rm-level results show that ination has a negative impact on rm-level
R&D expenses. However, this eect disappears if we correctly control for corporate holdings
of cash and marketable securities. Thus, the impact of ination on rm-level investments
in superior technologies is (at least partly) due to variations in corporate liquidity holdings.
Moreover, ination as well as corporate liquidity holdings do not aect the overall level of
corporate investments. Hence, the distorting impact of ination on corporate investments
portfolios by means of a reduction in corporate liquidity holdings is specic to investments in
advanced technologies. This empirical result directly approves the microeconomic mechanism
underlying our theoretical derivations of a negative aggregate relation between ination and
long-run TFP-growth.
43If 1 = 2:36 denotes the coecient of ination and  = :7578 the one of the lagged dependent variable the
long-run eect approximately amounts to
1
1 .
44Ination is considered as an exogenous variable (see above). The microeconomic variables are considered
as (potentially) endogenous.
257 Concluding remarks
The present paper presents an endogenous growth model that combines elements of the growth
and business cycle literature: it considers nancial markets frictions and their interaction with
short-run nominal constraints and endogenizes the productivity process via an endogenous
technology choice which is catalyzed by these frictions. We demonstrate that ination reduces
long-run productivity growth in this framework. Thus, TFP-growth is partially endogenized
by relating changes in the long-run balanced growth path of TFP to changes in monetary pol-
icy. The model replicates the negative empirical long-run relationship between ination and
TFP-growth as observed by Fischer (1993) and others adequately. In the empirical analysis, we
present micro-econometric evidence from disaggregated sectoral and rm-level data that is con-
sistent with our specic microeconomic mechanism underlying the macroeconomic monetary
transmission channel. In particular, we detect at the industry level that the negative eect of
ination on productivity-growth per sector varies systematically with (i) the riskiness (volatil-
ity) of investments in a sector (H2) and (ii) the average productivity-performance of a sector
over the sample (H3). The rm-level data reveal that an increase in ination is associated with
reduced corporate liquidity holdings in the U.S. economy (H1). In addition, aggregate ination
has a negative impact on rm-level R&D expenses, whereas we are able to show that the eect
is (at least partly) due to uctuations in corporate liquidity holdings just as the theoretical
model suggests. Therefore, the general equilibrium implications of the constraint optimal -
nancial contracting scheme are consistent with micro-econometric empirical evidence. In fact,
the disaggregated empirical results conrm the relevance of our specic monetary transmis-
sion channel even in developed countries such as the USA. These microeconomic interactions
lead to the key insight: the short-run interplay between ination, the nancial market friction
and a rm's compositional investment decision involve long-run consequences for TFP-growth.
Hence, the model postulates a novel aspect of monetary transmission in that movements in
the nominal interest rate are associated with changes in the long-run growth path of TFP.
Since dierences in TFP explain roughly 2/3 of cross-country income uctuations, dierences
in trend ination across countries represent an important factor to account for in explaining
these uctuations. This result entails strong policy implications for some (emerging) economies
since changes in monetary policy regimes represent a relatively inexpensive way to catch up in
terms of TFP and to encourage private sector development.
26A Appendix
A.1 Financial contract
In the following, we provide the algebraic solution of the nancial contract Ct = fzt;lz
t; t(t);t(t)g
dened in (12).
Optimal factor input ratio and the cost function: Obviously, part of the optimal
contract must be to use factor inputs in a cost minimizing combination. However, since factor
demands are determined via the contract Ct, they will not only reect the rm's prot maxi-
mization objective, but also the intermediary's need to break even in expectation. With our
Cobb-Douglas specication, the possibility of project failure then requires that factors earn
constant shares not of rm revenue, but of the total costs C (W z
t ;Rz
t; ~ yz
t) associated with a
targeted production scale ~ yz
















Furthermore, from constant returns to scale and the Cobb-Douglas specication of the




























t () are the per unit costs of producing a targeted output level ~ yz
t; since the
technology displays constant returns to scale, these per unit costs coincide with marginal costs.
Note that, as a consequence, the program to nd the optimal contract is linear in the project
size ~ yz
t.
First best - the socially optimal contract: First look at the rst best contract where
b = 0 such that the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem plays no role (but liquidity is scarce
and has an opportunity cost ~ Rt). The questions asked here are, what is the maximum overall
return on investment, and how does the corresponding socially optimal contract look like?
Suppose for the moment a binding participation constraint for the investor; indeed, we will
later verify that this is the case in a well-specied problem.45 Substituting from the binding




















Let ^ t denote the cuto value for the liquidity shock such that the project is continued if and









45By well-specied, we mean (i) that there is no self-nancing by the rms, and (ii) that the solution to the















In denition (31b), t(^ t) denotes the net social marginal return on one unit invested in an




t () > 0, (^ t) is maxi-
mized at the socially optimal cuto value ^ FB
t = 1
~ Rt. Moreover, from (31a), it is clear that the
entrepreneur is the residual claimant and receives the full social surplus from the project.
Second best - entrepreneurial moral hazard: Now consider the case where b > 0. First
of all note that general equilibrium considerations imply that the marginal net social return
under both the rst and the second best solution must be positive.46 Then, given a positive value
for t(^ t), the entrepreneur will seek to maximize F
t (^ t) by choosing the maximum investment
volume MCz
t ()~ yz
t that still guarantees investor participation. But from (12b), this is achieved
by maximizing the state contingent per unit transfer t(t) to the investor. Accordingly, the
second best contract prescribes to retain the minimum amount of prots in the rm that is
still consistent with incentive compatibility. Hence, the entrepreneur's incentive compatibility
constraint (12c) is binding at the maximum pledgeable unit return:
t(t) =







We can now solve for the largest investment volume MCz
t ()~ yz
t that is compatible with both
the investor's participation constraint and the entrepreneur's incentive constraint by substitut-


















t = Et (33)
Here, the expression in squared brackets represents the dierence between marginal cost of




~ Rt denote the cuto value that maximizes the expected marginal return to outside
investors, and note that equation (33) implies that, given some Et > 0, the expected (subject
to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) marginal return on outside investment is strictly smaller than
one.47
46To see this, suppose to the contrary that (^ FB
t )  0 such that the optimal contract would prescribe
zt = lz
t = 0, i.e. zero investment for any level of entrepreneurial equity Et. However, this implies ~ yz
t = 0 which
contradicts a general equilibrium with positive consumption and investment, and the price of the advanced
intermediate good would adjust such as to guarantee a positive marginal net social return. By the same token,
the second best solution must also involve a cuto rule ^ t with positive marginal net social return.
47Indeed, if this was not the case, investment would be self-nancing and there would be no demand for
28Solving equation (33) for the maximum investment volume conditional on a given cuto




















is an equity multiplier, whose denominator species the amount of internal funds that the
rm has to contribute per unit of investment in order to compensate the outside investor for
the shortfall implied by the expression in squared brackets in (33). Finally, using (31a) and
(34a), the entrepreneur's expected net payo becomes:

F
t (^ t) = t(^ t)t(^ t)Et (35)
It now remains to determine the second best continuation threshold, to be denoted ^ 
t.
Given an entrepreneurial equity position Et, the second best cuto ^ 
t maximizes (35). It is
clear that ^ 
t 2 [^ 0
t; ^ FB
t ]. Within this interval there emerges a trade-o since, on the one hand,
increasing ^ t implies that continuation is possible in more contingencies and, on the other hand,
decreasing ^ t allows to increase the amount of initial investment MCz
t ()~ yz
t by increasing the
equity multiplier t(^ t). After substitution from the denitions (31b) and (34b) into (35), it is
straightforward to show that the optimal continuation value ^ 













which has the interpretation that the second best cuto value minimizes the expected unit












liquidity at all in that the investor's participation constraint would be non-binding. A sucient condition for



















t); then, it is apparent that ^ FB
t = ^ 0
t if
b = 0, which leads to the conclusion that, in order to rule out self-nancing, a positive wedge ^ FB
t   ^ 0
t > 0 and
therefore b > 0 are essential.
29Finally, using the optimality condition for the cuto value allows to rewrite the entrepreneur's















t   ^ 
t
^ 
t   ^ 0
t
Et (38)
Observe how this expression reects the trade-o underlying the choice of ^ 
t 2 [^ 0
t; ^ FB
t ].













Implementation and aggregate liquidity demand: In order to cover liquidity shocks
up to the second best cuto ^ 
t, it is necessary that outside investors commit funds at the
initial contracting stage (stage one). The reason is that, by issuing corporate claims at the
interim stage (stage two), it is not possible to raise enough funds because the entrepreneurial
commitment problem limits the maximum return pledgeable to outside investors at ^ 0
t < ^ 
t. It
is then an natural question to ask how the second best policy can actually be implemented at
the initial contracting stage; moreover, in view of our modelling hypothesis that an economy's
physical investment portfolio is aected by the degree to which rms can insure their activities
by means of holding corporate liquidity, there arises the related question of whether there is a
second best policy that features rms (rather than the intermediary) holding liquidity.
Aggregating over the advanced sector rms, we can derive two measures of aggregate liq-
uidity demand. The rst one is relevant if the second best policy should be feasible for each
individual rm, but liquidity provision is organized in a way that disregards the scope for risk
sharing across rms:





















t <  Dt (39b)
It is clear that this latter concept requires some form of nancial intermediation.
Now, drawing on Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we turn to the institutional details sup-
porting the implementation of the second best policy derived in Section 4.5. One possibility
is to have the nancial intermediary initially extend the amount MCz
t ()~ yz
t   Et to the en-
trepreneur together with an irrevocable line of credit of maximum size ^ 
tP z
t ~ yz
t to be drawn
from as needed at the interim stage. Given our assumptions on the details of the moral hazard
problem which does not envisage distraction of resources on the part of the entrepreneur, this
30line of credit implements the second best solution as long as the credit line, irrespective of the
amount tP z
t ~ yz
t  ^ 
tP z
t ~ yz
t of liquidity actually requested, is provided free of charge. Since the
rms' liquidity shocks are independent, the aggregate amount of resources needed to cover the
advanced sector's renancing needs at the interim stage is then given by D
t. At the level of an
individual advanced sector rm, an alternative would be via a liquidity covenant which involves






to the entrepreneur, whereby the requirement is imposed that the amount ^ 
tP z
t ~ yz
t is not sunk
in the project but kept in the form of readily marketable assets. However, at the aggregate
level across all advanced sector rms, implementation of the second best policy via liquidity
covenants is seen to require strictly more resources  Dt > D
t because liquidity is kept separately
at each rm, thus forgoing the potential to pool liquidity across rms.48
Given our empirical interest, the question arises whether there is a second best policy
that features rms (rather than the intermediary) holding liquidity. We now give an example
for such a policy. For that purpose, rst dene a number  t which is implicitly given by
D
t =  tP z
t ~ yz
t; then, a policy of the desired kind is constructed as follows: At stage one, the




t  Et to the entrepreneur. The
nancial contract further stipulates that the amount  tP z
t ~ yz
t must be held in the form of liquid
assets. The rm will then invest up to the maximum admissible scale MCz
t ()~ yz
t   Et and
deposit its liquid assets with the intermediary (at zero interest). Now, at stage two, when
hit by a liquidity shock t, the rm must rst use up its own asset position of  tP z
t ~ yz
t; only
then can it approach the intermediary for additional funds, which the latter will residually
provide up to the second best quantity ^ 
tP z
t ~ yz
t. The intermediary is able to provide this
liquidity by calling idle funds from those rms who receive shocks t <  t. Obviously, this
policy replicates the second best in terms of both the initial investment scale and the cuto ^ 
t.
Thus, it only remains to check whether above arrangement is feasible, which is the case since,
from the denition of  t, the supply of and demand for liquidity are equal at the aggregate
level: P z
t ~ yz
t  t = D





0 tg(t)dt. Further variations on the institutional structure
implementing the second best, involving advanced sector rms holding assets other than cash
(e.g. corporate debt issued by the basic sector rms) as well as liquid assets earning non-zero
rates of return, are possible.
A.2 Competitive equilibrium relations
We can derive a set of relations that characterize a competitive equilibrium at the aggregate
level. Specically, for ~ Rt > 1, the household's cash constraint (1b) is binding and we can aggre-
gate over households and entrepreneurs to obtain a condition relating aggregate consumption
and investment to agents' nominal asset holdings:
48In the benchmark section of their paper which features an exogenous supply of liquidity, Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) establish equivalence of the two methods of providing liquidity. This result stems from the fact that
their economy allows for a technology ("cash") to transfer wealth across the stages of the nancial contracting
problem and the additional assumption that "cash" is not scarce. Conversely, in our economy "cash" is available,
but its (limited) supply is determined in general equilibrium via households' nancial deposits and monetary
policy. Importantly then, liquidity is costly (it has a price ~ Rt > 1), and agents have an incentive to economize
on its usage. The consequence is that intermediated credit lines and liquidity holdings on behalf of the rms
are no longer equivalent.
31Qt + (1   )At = Ptct; (40)
where ct = cH
t + (1   )cE
t . Then, the evolution of nominal wealth held by households is
determined via the nominal budget constraint (1c) and the binding cash constraint (1b):













where we note that t = Dt + Et. This relation stipulates that, at the end of any given
period, the nominal resources Dt + Et lost due to liquidity shocks are re-channelled to the
household sector. Accordingly then, while the termination of projects implies that the pro-
duction of real output is curbed, the amount of nominal resources ("money") circulating is
unaected by liquidity shocks. Now, making use (i) of a zero-prot condition for rms in the
basic sector, rms in the advanced sector (net of entrepreneurial rents ~ F
t (^ 
t)Et) and the nan-
cial intermediary, (ii) of the nancial market clearing condition (4), and (iii) of the aggregate
cash constraint (40), one obtains:
Mt+1 = Mt + Jt +
n















This relation has the intuitive interpretation that the evolution of nominal household wealth
is governed by cash injections Jt and the net cash ow from the entrepreneurial sector (en-
trepreneurial consumption expenditure minus retained earnings) to the household sector. The
evolution of nominal wealth in the entrepreneurial sector itself follows:













where Et = At. In order to derive a convenient expression for the evolution of aggregate
wealth, we add equations (41) and (43) and employ the zero-prot condition mentioned above
as well as condition (4) to obtain:
Mt+1 + At+1   (Dt + Et) = Ptyt; (44)
which gives immediately rise to a modied quantity relation:
Pt =
Mt+1 + At+1   (Dt + Et)
yt
(45)
Again, this equation allows for an intuitive interpretation, namely that the contemporaneous
price level Pt is determined as the ratio of nominal resources channelled through the goods
market to aggregate output.49
49To see this, note that the agents' end-of-period wealth Mt+1 +At+1 is eectively generated via rm prots
whose generation requires transactions on the goods market; from this amount, the nominal resources which
are absorbed by liquidity needs and later redistributed to the household sector must be deduced.
32A.3 Equilibrium
Denition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) Given initial conditions fk0;z0;A0;M0g and real-
izations of monetary policy fJtg1
t=0 and idiosyncratic shocks fi
tg1
t=0, a competitive equilibrium is






































1. given prices, the allocation solves the household problem (1) as well as the basic and
advanced rm problems (8) and (12);
2. entrepreneurs follow their behavioral rules and the nancial intermediary breaks even;
3. aggregation across agents and sectors as well as among the entrepreneurs obtains, i.e. for
a generic variable v
E;i




t di = vE
t ;
4. the nancial market as well as the markets for nal goods, intermediate goods and factor
inputs clear.
Note that the competitive equilibrium is not ecient due to the entrepreneurial moral
hazard problem that leads to the termination of ex-post ecient projects and the externality
of knowledge on the future productivity of investment projects.
A.4 The responsiveness of corporate liquidity to changes in the -
nancial rate (H1)
In the following, we demonstrate that the general equilibrium eect of the nancial rate ( ~ Rt) on
the corporate provision of liquidity ^ 
t is negative as summarized in H1. Therefore, we assume
a specic functional form for the distribution of liquidity shocks: G() = 
1
,  > 0. Hence,
in accordance with Aghion et al. (2005), we assume that the distribution of liquidity shocks is
monotonically increasing in .











































Taking the total derivative of (47) and noting that the functional form for the distribution
































1   (1 + )
< 0 (47)
Thus, given that the functional form for the distribution of liquidity shocks is monotonically
increasing in , the general equilibrium provision of corporate liquidity is decreasing in the
nominal nancial rate ~ R as stated in H1.
33A.5 Construction of the TFP measure
We construct the series of aggregate TFP-growth, as a residual from the human capital aug-
mented Solow-model.50 We follow the basic specication in Caselli (2005) who computes




t , where A is the level of TFP, y the real GDP per worker in international dollars,
k the physical capital stock per worker and h the human capital stock per worker. The rst
measures stem from the Penn World Tables (PWT) and the latter from Barro and Lee (2001),
respectively. The capital stock (K) is computed with the perpetual inventory method, whereby
the depreciation rate () is set to 6% and the initial capital stock is computed as K0 =
I0
g+.
g is the average geometric growth rate for the investment series between the rst year with
available data and 1970.51 The stock of human capital is derived according to Hall and Jones
(1999): h = exp(s), where s is the average years of schooling in the population over 25 year
old and the function (s) is piecewise linear with slope 0.13 for s  4, 0.10 for 4 < s  8 and
0.07 for 8 < s. We incorporate a share of private capital per worker of 1=3 ( = 1=3). Caselli
(2005) provides a comprehensive discussion of various robustness tests to this procedure in a
development accounting framework. He shows that the explanatory power of the TFP-series
(2=3) to explain variations in GDP is robust to the inclusion of dierent measures for the qual-
ity of human capital or dierent estimation procedures for k.52 Therefore, we follow his basic
specication. We compute the TFP series for 88 countries from 1970-1980. Our TFP-series
complies with Caselli (2005) for 1996. We drop the TFP-measure for the rst ten observations
and start the series in 1980 in order to minimize the inuence of the initial capital stock on our
results. The rankings of the TFP-measures across countries and years yield plausible results.53
50The inclusion of various control variables reduces the eective size of the panel to a minimum of 68 countries
in some estimations.
51The investment series starts for 54 countries in 1950, for 17 in 1955 and for the remaining 17 in 1960.
52We note that this explanatory power decreases signicantly if  exceeds 0.5, which, however, does not
comply with existing empirical estimates.
53The ve highest (log-) TFP level exhibit Ireland in 2000-1997, respectively, and Italy in 1999. The 50 lowest
TFP-levels are measured in Zaire, Malawi, Romania, Zambia, Rwanda, Lesotho and China for dierent time
periods, respectively. The complete ranking is available from the authors on request.
34Table 1: USA: Sectoral volatility and mean of growth in value added per worker
BEA Compustat
Industries vol rank growth rank vol rank growth rank
Food products 2.8 28 6.7 15 0.49 20 0.08 21
Beverages 4.1 26 6.2 18 0.47 24 0.06 22
Tobacco 9.5 8 9.8 2 0.52 15 0.12 14
Textiles 6.6 19 5.2 24 0.52 16 0.12 15
Wearing apparel, except footwear 5.5 23 3.9 26 0.55 6 0.06 24
Leather products 10.8 6 3.4 27 0.47 25 0.04 27
Footwear, except rubber or plastic 8.0 14 0.6 28 0.66 1 0.05 25
Wood products, except furniture 12.3 4 7.1 12 0.53 14 0.19 8
Paper and products 7.0 17 7.5 9 0.50 18 0.09 18
Printing and publishing 4.6 25 8.2 5 0.55 5 0.17 9
Petroleum reneries 22.4 1 8.7 4 0.37 28 0.06 23
Misc. Petroleum and coal products 9.0 10 7.5 8 0.49 21 0.21 7
Industrial chemicals 9.8 7 6.6 16 0.49 22 1.30 1
Other chemicals 3.7 27 7.5 7 0.51 17 0.09 20
Plastic products 9.1 9 11.4 1 0.53 12 0.14 11
Rubber products 6.2 20 5.4 23 0.50 19 0.09 19
Pottery, china, earthenware 8.8 12 6.4 17 0.53 13 0.47 4
Glass and products 5.8 22 6.0 21 0.57 3 0.23 6
Other non-metallic mineral products 6.9 18 6.0 22 0.44 27 0.04 26
Iron and Steel 13.2 3 4.3 25 0.46 26 0.03 28
Non-ferrous metals 14.8 2 6.7 13 0.48 23 0.10 17
Fabricated metal products 5.5 24 6.1 20 0.54 10 0.11 16
Machinery, except electrical 8.5 13 7.2 11 0.55 7 0.29 5
Professional & scientic equipment 11.8 5 9.5 3 0.57 2 0.84 2
Machinery, electric 7.8 15 7.9 6 0.56 4 0.16 10
Transport equipment 8.9 11 6.7 14 0.53 11 0.12 12
Furniture, except metal 7.1 16 7.3 10 0.55 8 0.12 13
Other manufacturing products 5.9 21 6.2 19 0.54 9 0.50 3
BEA: rank correlation coecient of 0.232 (p   value = 0:030); Compustat: rank correlation coecient
of 0.479 (p   value = 0:010).
35Table 2: Aggregate data: 5-year-averages: Ination & TFP growth
TFP growth
OLS LSDV GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys GMM-sys
in -.0014 -.0009 -.0020 -.0016 -.0022 -.0059 -.0646
(-7.33) (-4.17) (-2.74) (-2.44) (-2.96) (-2.05) (-2.85)
in-vol -.0009 .0026
(-2.01) (1.66)
credit .2479 -.7932 .7770 -.5247 .8965 .7517 .0139 .4846
(.54) (-.93) (.69) (-.46) (.81) (.66) (.01) (.58)
trade .0021 .0154 .0066 .0027 .0047 .0079 .0076
(.82) (.96) (1.05) (.35) (.87) (1.22) (1.38)
ki .1309
(2.21)
ppr .3130 .1759 .4452 .3656 .4182 .4294 .4779 -.2293
(3.58) (1.26) (2.94) (2.53) (2.81) (2.92) (3.32) (-1.71)
kg -.0113 -.0687 -.0243 -.0145 -.0214 -.0257 -.0145 -.0606
(-.59) (-.79) (-.87) (-.54) (-.81) (-.95) (-.54) (-1.07)
tot -.0066 -.0013 -.0055 -.0164 -.0058 -.0062 -.0047 .2247
(-.87) (-.12) (-.59) (-1.54) (-.66) (-.67) (-.51) (2.18)
lag dep. var. -.0049 -.0229 -.0180 -.0183 -.0162 -.0171 -.0151 -.6202
(-3.24) (-5.28) (-5.53) (-5.07) (-5.52) (-5.41) (-5.65) (-4.20)
time-FE - - - - yes - -
Cou./Obs. 86/363 86/363 86/363 86/363 86/363 86/362 86/362 22/107
1. auto-cor. - - 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.034
2. auto-cor. - - 0.127 0.129 0.175 0.113 0.211 0.385
Hansen-test - - 0.122 0.287 0.161 0.108 0.195 0.939
We specify ination, ination-volatility, credit, trade and the investment share as endogenous and property rights,
government share and terms of trade as exogenous variables in the GMM system estimation. Ination volatility
is measured by the average standard deviation of yearly ination rates. Predetermined lagged level of TFP as
lagged dependent variable (lagged TFP-level labelled as endogenous according to Hansen test in OECD sub-sample).
36Table 3: Sectoral data
Ination-sensitivity in volatile/high-growth vs. non-volatile/low-growth sectors
Growth rate of value added
full sample vol>med vol<1.qua full sample full sample full sample full sample
ination -.9632 -1.19 -.7390 -.8014 -.8107 -.8700 -1.02





GDP-growth 1.20 1.29 1.10 1.19 1.19 1.20 1.19
(4.36) (2.67) (3.92) (4.36) (4.34) (4.36) (4.35)
L.GDP-growth -.7851 -.8938 -.6764 -.7851 -.7869 -.7839 -.7858
(-2.92) (-1.71) (-4.11) (-2.92) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.92)
credit -11.46 -15.01 -7.91 -11.46 -11.52 -11.42 -11.49
(-3.26) (-2.23) (3.86) (-3.26) (3.27) (3.52) (-3.27)
inv-share .5734 .8181 .3287 -.6305 .5734 .5720 .5741
(2.04) (1.55) (1.64) (2.04) (2.05) (2.03) (2.04)
Ind./Obs. 28/946 14/473 14/473 28/946 28/946 28/946 28/946
The correlation coecient between the volatility- and mean rankings amounts to .23 (s.e. 0.03) according to
Spearman's rank correlation test.
1963-2000 yearly data. Always include a constant. Heteroscedasticity- and serial correlation robust s.e.
t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
37Table 4: U.S. rm-level yearly data: R&D versus investments
Corporate liquidity R&D R&D/inv R&D/asset inv/asset
OLS GMM-sys OLS OLS GMM-sys GMM-sys LSDV LSDV LSDV
ination -2.86 -4.08 -.4157 -.3716 -.5435 -.3332 -.6739 -.0992 .2161
(-8.10) (-6.96) (-7.70) (-7.16) (-3.56) (-2.67) (-3.19) (6.15) (6.15)
corp. liquidity .0167 .0510
(4.29) (2.78)
assets .0084 -.0064 -.0001 -.0007 -.0037 -.0020 -4.9E-04 -3.7E-04 -.0002
(1.98) (-.40) (-.06) (-.75) (-1.35) (-.62) (-1.64) (-4.88) (-3.72)
opincome -.0192 -.0327 .0068 .0062 .0288 .0170 .0002 .0001 -.0001
(-.42) (-.50) (2.36) (2.03) (3.13) (1.92) (.73) (1.77) (-.28)
reearn .0168 .0441 -.0006 -.0017 -.0049 -.0058 -.0002 3.0E-04 .0006
(1.76) (1.30) (-.60) (-1.74) (-1.01) (-1.43) (-1.47) (1.74) (5.70)
inv -.0003 .0333 -.0001 .0005 .0060 .0018
(-.03) (.95) (-.09) (.33) (1.18) (.33)
lag-dep.-var. .9039 .8369 1.02 1.00 .9840 .9202
(31.11) (11.35) (63.72) (56.92) (16.22) (11.90)
Firms 6972 6972 6978 6978 6978 6978 7710 7711 7711
Observations 56424 56424 56445 56445 56445 56445 65067 65147 65074
1. auto-cor. .978 .000 .244 .212 .001 .000
2. auto-cor. .487 .788 .722
Hansen-test .442 .107 .135
The maximum lag is restricted to 10 years in order to reduce the size of the IV matrix.
1970-2000 yearly data. Heteroscedasticity robust s.e. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signicant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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